A typical UUOA can be divided approximately into three distinct sections: (i) trade rules on the common use of unit hydrocarbons – traction participation, new provisions and adaptations (production mode and CAPEX); (ii) the operating rules of the unit (which are similar to those of a joint enterprise agreement) – the designation of the unit operator and the rules applicable to the unit`s works council; and (iii) legislative and other provisions, including force majeure, delays, resignation, termination and settlement of disputes. A UUOA (unlike an JOA) will generally deal with areas without units, (i) operations carried out by a single contract group with respect to a non-interterritorial reservoir within the largest “unit zone”; or (ii) operations carried out by a single contract group outside the “unit area” but using unit facilities. A number of schedules for a UUOA are essential for the unit process, in particular the “redefinition of technical procedures” that apply to redefining the proportion in proportion to the proportion of the shares of each group of contracts (often referred to as “tract participations”). Similarly, the unit`s accounting procedure is often subject to a special audit. It should be noted that the transfer or transfer of interests from the failing group to non-failing contributors may, in practice, be difficult to eliminate. In the context of UOA, the interests of the failing group in the unit stem from its underlying contract, which is unlikely to be transferred under the UUOA (since this would require the agreement of the host government (or its national oil/gas company) as the contracting authority. Therefore, unless the underlying contract of the failing group has been transferred to the contributing parties, the status of transfer or transfer of the interests of the failing group under the UUOA to the non-failing parties contributing is therefore debatable. is of individual application and does not address the additional complexities that occur when the unit area crosses the border between two (or more) countries; This chapter discusses some of the key features of a typical unitary agreement, its main purpose and its interaction with the JOA. It will focus in particular on national unity (i.e. the association of a territory with two or more licences within the same national borders) and will not deal with cross-border unity (i.e. the unification of a sector that extends licences in two or more different countries).
require defaulting parties to sell their shares to non-failing contributing parties for an agreed “feed-in price.” References made in AIPN UUOA 20026 to alternative valuations based on valuation value, gross book value and market value discount have been removed and parties are now free to agree on buy-out prices. In the absence of a buy-out price agreement, it is determined by an expert on the fair value of the project interest of the defaulting parties minus (i) the late amounts; (ii) assessment costs; and (ii) a specific discount (to be agreed) on fair value; Under the 2006 UUOA AIPN, a default occurs when a party does not pay its share of the cost of the unit or provides the necessary guarantee (if any). However, a party (optional) may also be late if it does not meet its obligations of compensation under its contract or the UUOA, or if it is late under its JOA (which delays the failures of the JOA and UUOA). When a defaulting party does not resolve its default, the non-failing parties of its contractual group are the main culprits in correcting the default and, if the default is corrected within the contractual group, they are entitled to exercise their remedies within the context of the relevant JOA. However, if the contractual groups of the defaulting party (the failing parties), the parties of the other group (non-failing) have the opportunity to contribute to the deficit and then choose one of the following options: the Association of International Petrole